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Abstract
This perspective argues that for-profit hospitals will be heavily affected by epidemic crises, including the current 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. Policy-makers should be aware that for-profit hospitals in 
particular are likely to face financial distress. The suspension of all non-urgent elective surgery and the relegation 
of market-based mechanisms that determines the allocation and compensation of care puts the financial state 
of these hospitals at serious risk. We identify three organisational factors that determine which hospitals might 
be most affected (ie, care-portfolio, size and whether it is private equity [PE]-owned). In addition, we analyse 
contextual factors that could explain the impact of financial distress among for-profit hospitals on the wider 
healthcare system. 
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Background 
For-profit hospitals pursue returns on equity. They do so 
with a business model that, firstly, relies on high and stable 
cashflow (for which healthcare is well-known) and, secondly, 
targets more lucrative sectors such as elective surgeries for less 
complex patients.1 The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic suddenly makes this business model much more 
risky. In this perspective we argue that the for-profit hospital 
sector will see considerable changes. We identify three 
organisational factors that determine the financial resilience 
of for-profit hospitals, and we discuss that certain healthcare 
systems are more vulnerable than others to financial distress 
in the for-profit hospital sector.
The COVID-19 outbreak has caused a surge of patients 
seeking medical care in numerous hospitals, especially in 
facilities with many acute care beds. Other hospitals might 
be confronted with the opposite fate: they are practically 
empty. In several countries, it is notable that particularly 
private, for-profit hospital are under severe pressure.2 For-
profit hospitals tend to focus on non-acute elective care, 
more so than other hospital ownership types.1,3,4 They have 
therefore experienced a drop in demand. First, non-acute care 
had to be put on hold to free up human resources, facilities, 
beds and equipment materials. Second, suspending non-
acute care minimises the spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Third, the supply 
of personal protective equipment is limited so it has to be 
used where it is most needed, and non-acute care therefore 
had to make way for acute care. Fourth, in various healthcare 
systems, the public emergency response to COVID-19 has 
side-lined market-based mechanisms (eg, patient choice and 
fee-for-service contracts) and for-profit hospitals relied on 
these mechanisms. The collapse in stock market prices for 
for-profit hospital chains reflects the financial hardship the 
sector is experiencing. For example, the share prices of Spire 
Healthcare Group, Community Health Systems, and Tenet 
Healthcare Corporation fell by approximately 60% from 20/2 
and 20/3.5 HCA Healthcare and Universal Health Services 
saw their share prices almost halved.5 The price decrease of 
publicly-quoted (PQ) healthcare chains were steeper than 
the decline of the S&P 500, which was -28.6% between 20/2 
and 20/3. And although the stock market has recovered 
somewhat, HCA, the bellwether of the industry, skipped share 
repurchases and dividend payments.6 
 
Definition 
We focus specifically on for-profit hospitals. For-profit 
hospitals are different from public and non-profit entities 
insofar as that they can distribute their net earnings to their 
shareholders and hold all residual claimant rights. Non-profits 
have to comply with a non-distribution constraint and are 
expected to serve the interests of ‘beneficiary stakeholders.’7 
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Financial Resilience For-Profit Hospital Sector: Three 
Organisational Factors 
We define three organisational factors that determine the 
financial resilience of for-profit hospitals in the specific 
context of pandemics such as the outbreak of COVID-19: care 
portfolio, size and ownership. 
Care Portfolio 
The impact of the epidemic on for-profit hospitals depends 
strongly on their specific care portfolios. These range from 
more mixed portfolios to the almost exclusive provision 
of outpatient treatments (ie, outpatient hospitals and 
independent treatment centres, known as ‘ambulatory surgical 
centers,’ ASCs, in the United States). Hospitals that only 
provide non-acute care experience a larger drop in demand. 
Even those for-profit hospitals that provide acute care beds 
tend, financially, to rely heavily on elective treatments.1 For-
profit hospitals will lose a great chunk of their revenue during 
the COVID-19 response, eroding their profit margins. Even if 
for-profit hospitals can compensate for the financial setback 
by increasing their capacity of acute care beds, this may not 
be a lucrative business and serve only to cover costs. In some 
countries, acute care beds are often the most expensive service 
to provide.8,9 
Size
For-profit hospitals come in all shapes and sizes. The large, 
often chain-affiliated, hospitals are more resilient than small, 
often sole-proprietorship, hospitals because they often have 
more reserves and are able to cross-transfer money from 
different businesses. Small-scale hospitals do not have that 
luxury and tend to be less profitable,10 which makes them 
more vulnerable to financial default because they might have 
not been able to build up reserves. 
Private Equity Owned Versus Publicly-Quoted and Owner-
Managed Hospitals
We argue that the private equity (PE)-owned hospitals are 
especially at risk of default on their payments compared to PQ 
and owner-managed (OM) entities because PE firms tend to 
take higher financial risks.11 The PE-owned hospitals are often 
the most debt-inflated providers.12,13 Because of their high 
debt-to-equity ratios, they depend on a constant cashflow. 
Moreover, PE firms usually have short time horizons: they 
seek to sell companies with a decent profit after a limited 
period. This risk-embracing short-term strategy may turn 
against PE-owned hospitals in an epidemic crisis.
OM hospitals tend, at least in theory, to be more risk-averse 
and to have longer time horizons for running their businesses 
because the investors are involved in the daily management 
of the company and are more ‘emotionally’ committed. For 
example, physicians who own their hospitals want to earn a 
decent financial return but are also incentivised to maintain a 
financially sustainable business over a long period. 
PQ hospitals have to comply with stricter financial 
transparency and accounting regulations, which may make 
these hospitals’ finances more robust than others’. However, 
the financial status of PQ hospitals still varies (see Table 1). 
For example, HCA has a solvency rate of -13% in 2018 and 
Tenet Healthcare has a rate of -1%, whereas Universal 
Health Services has a rate of 48%.5 (This may however be 
explained by the previous involvement of PE in HCA and 
Tenet Healthcare13). Due to the pandemic, it will be more 
difficult for PQ hospitals to raise funds on the stock market. 
PQ hospitals with high debts and plummeting share prices are 
therefore confronted with a double burden. Table 1 also shows 
that PQ hospitals are especially active in the United States. 
Financial Resilience to an Epidemic Shock 
We argue that the care portfolio of for-profit hospitals is the 
most influential factor for their financial resilience, followed 
by size and ownership. Figure presents a schematic outline 
of these factors. The corners indicate the combination of 
organisational factors of for-profit hospitals which determine 
their financial resilience in an epidemic crisis. (Because 
small-scale PE-owned hospitals are very rare, or non-existent, 
we left these corners out). The corners include scores. One (1) 
indicates the most vulnerable organisational form and six (6) 
indicates the least vulnerable. Thus, small-scale OM hospitals 
that focus strongly on outpatient treatments are most at risk 
(corner 1 in Figure). The for-profit hospitals that are on the 
safer side of the spectrum (corner 6) are providers that are 
Table 1. Financial Status Pre-COVID-19 of the Main Publicly-Quoted Hospital Chains
Operating Revenue 
(Turnover) the Last 
Available Year (US$Billion)
Average Annual Profit 
Margin (2010-2018) (EBT 
Over Operating Revenue)
Solvency Rate (Debt/
Asset) 2018 Global Outreach
a
HCA Healthcare, Inc. 46.7 (2018) 10.0% -12.6% US, UK
Ramsay Health Care Limited 8.0 (2019) 8.2% 26.3% AU, DE, UK, ID, MY, HK, IT, FR, DA
Tenet Healthcare Corporation 18. 3 (2018) 1.3% -0.5% US 
Community Health Systems, Inc. 14.2 (2018) -1.6% -9.7% US
Universal Health Services, Inc. 10.8 (2018) 10.9% 47.8% US, UK 
Spire Healthcare Group PLC 1.2 (2018) 12.3% 31.3% UK
Fresenius SE & CO KGAA 31.3 (2016) 10.8% 44.7% (2016) DE, ES 
Abbreviations: US, United States; UK, United Kingdom; AU, Australia; DE, Germany; ID, Indonesia; MY, Malaysia; HK, Hong Kong; IT, Italy; FR, France; DA, 
Denmark; ES, Spain; COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; EBT, earning before taxes.
Source: Bureau van Dijk.5
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(i) not owned by a PE firm, (ii) that provide a mixed care-
portfolio and (iii) are relatively large.
Context Matters 
The impact on the healthcare system of for-profit hospitals 
getting into financial trouble is context-dependent. 
Table 2 outlines the factors that determine the vulnerability 
of different healthcare systems and we have selected a few 
countries to illustrate this. 
The impact of COVID-19 on the for-profit sector differs 
by country. Firstly, the infection rate of COVID-19 varies by 
country. Australia has fared relatively well, whereas Spain and 
the United States have been more severely affected. Secondly, 
the role that for-profit hospitals have either been assigned 
or taken on voluntarily during the COVID-19 outbreak also 
varies by country. For instance, Spanish for-profit hospitals 
have been under governmental control since the epidemic 
broke out, and the impact of this measure on the private 
sector is difficult to predict. By contrast, the private sector 
in Poland has been side-lined; if they receive neither a cost-
base recovery rate nor a loss-making rate during this period, 
it could deal a severe financial blow to the sector. Other 
countries, including the United kingdom and Australia, 
do receive a cost-base recovery rate. The question then is 
whether the cost-base recovery rate will be sufficient to avoid 
financial difficulties in the long run. In the United States, for-
profit hospitals have a different problem: during the crisis, 
they will be treating more patients who are covered by low-
margin Medicaid reimbursement rates. US hospitals also face 
an especially high burden of debt, likely due to the high level 
of PE ownership in the United States for-profit sector. 
The extent to which different healthcare systems depend on 
the for-profit sector for providing in-patient care differs. The 
for-profit sector’s share of in-patient beds ranges from 30% in 
Germany to 5% in the United Kingdom. In addition, in most 
healthcare systems there is high degree of market consolidation 
in in-patient hospital care, which makes healthcare systems 
like Germany’s relatively vulnerable when a for-profit chain 
with a large market share faces financial distress. Although 



















Figure. Schematic Outline Financial Resilience For-Profit Hospitals. 
Abbreviations: PE,  private equity; OM, owner-managed; PQ, publicly-quoted.
chains, if they fail, the impact on the wider healthcare system 
is much more serious. The much smaller for-profit hospital 
sector in the United Kingdom is at less risk and plays a limited 
role versus other healthcare systems, however the market 
consolidation in the United Kingdom for-profit sector is 
substantial: when one large chain defaults on its payments, it 
may significantly disrupt the entire for-profit sector. In other 
countries, such as Germany and Australia, debts associated 
with PE ownership are also a serious threat to for-profit in-
patient hospitals. 
Most countries in Table 2 lean heavily on the private 
sector to provide outpatient care. (In the United Kingdom its 
influence is much smaller, however). This may make the ASC 
sector relatively vulnerable to financial distress in the for-
profit sector. Although it is challenging to obtain data on the 
ownership status of the different ASCs in each country, we do 
know that in the United States and Poland a number of ASC 
chains are PE-owned,13,14 and this could make these sectors 
more vulnerable.
Conclusion
In various countries, the public sector has turned to the for-
profit sector for help, but prices with a viable profit-margin 
are deemed publicly unacceptable in many countries during 
this crisis response. We argue and conclude that this virus 
will, mostly likely, weaken the position of the for-profit 
hospital sector, just as the Great Depression did in the 
1930s.1 (Although 90 years ago, social healthcare insurance 
was far more limited in most countries). For most, their 
revenue decreases by the day and options to attract capital 
are limited – private investors are cautious and it can be 
challenging to acquire additional bank loans. The financial 
condition of the hospitals prior to the COVID-19 outbreak 
is an important determinant of how able they are to absorb 
the external financial shock. One of the lessons that for-profit 
hospitals and regulators can learn from this crisis is that for-
profit hospitals should set aside some reserves for a rainy day 
because black swans also exist in hospital care. Likewise, we 
should be wary of hospital business models that have high 
debt-to-equity ratios. 
The disruptive effect of COVID-19 will highlight which 
for-profit hospitals lack the financial resilience to outlive this 
crisis. In this perspective we state that (1) some for-profit 
hospital forms are more vulnerable than others (see Figure), 
and (2) that some healthcare systems are more vulnerable to a 
fragile for-profit hospital sector (Table 2). We therefore want 
to make policy-makers aware that the pandemic may lead to 
significant changes both within the for-profit hospital sector 
and in relation to the broader healthcare system. 
The financial fragility of the for-profit hospital sector can set 
three things in motion: 
1. Some hospitals might have to close. This requires a 
governmental response, either by bailing them out, 
nationalising the hospitals, or coordinating their default.44 
2. PE firms might seize this opportunity to buy out for-profit 
hospitals, but the desirability of these firms infiltrating 
the healthcare system is questionable.45 
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Table 2. Contextual and Institutional Factors Related to the Financial Resilience of For-Profit Hospitals and the Vulnerability of Healthcare Systems
United States United Kingdom Spain Germany Australia Poland 
1. COVID-19 
prevalence on 29 
April
+++ ++ +++ ++ - +
1 012 583 cases, 58 355 deaths15 161 145 cases, 21 678 deaths15 210 773 cases, 23 822 deaths15 157 641 cases, 6115 deaths15 6738 cases, 88 deaths15 12 218 cases, 596 deaths15
2. Private sector 
involvement in 
COVID-19 outbreak 
++ ++ +++ ++ + --
For-profit hospitals are in the 
COVID-19 frontline. They are 
legally obliged to treat patients 
in need for emergency care, 
regardless of ability of pay.16 
The increase of publicly funded 
patients (uninsured, Medicaid, 
Medicare) will decrease profit 
margins because rates are 
substantially lower than private 
rates.17
The NHS has block-bought the 
capacity of the private sector. 
The private sector receives a 
cost-covering price.18  
The government has taken 
a more intrusive approach 
of placing private healthcare 
providers under their control, 
assuming charge of their 
buildings, human resources 
and material resources (eg, 
respirators).19
For-profit hospitals has joined 
forces against COVID-19 
alongside public and non-profit 
hospitals.20 German hospitals 
receive a compensation of €560 
per day for an empty bed. The 
government in addition made a 
federal budget available for ICU 
beds of €50 000 per bed.21
The private hospital sector helps 
during the epidemic crisis on a cost 
recovery basis after they warned the 
government that for-profit hospitals 
might need to close as a result of 
the suspension of most non-urgent 
elective surgeries.22-24 The private 
sector receives a cost-covering price.
The involvement of for-profit 
hospitals has been limited or 
blocked by the government.25
3. Share of for-profit 
hospitals in in-
patient care
+ - + ++ + +
17.0% share in beds (2016)26 3.3% share in acute beds (2014)27 19.1% share in beds (2017)
26 30.4% share in beds (2017)26 18.9% share in beds (2016)26 12% share in beds (2016)28
4. Share of for-
profit hospitals in 
outpatient care 
services
++ - + +++ ++ +++
The number of ASC (generally 
for-profit) has increased by an 
average annual rate of 1.0% 
between 2012 and 2016.29 5603 
ASCs were providing treatments 
to Medicare patients in 2017.29 
In England, 6% of all NHS elective 
activity are done in ASCs (2017-
2018).30 However, they also 
provide care to private patients, 
hence, they play a larger role 
in the healthcare system than  
the 6%. 
The private sector has 29% 
of surgical interventions in 
outpatient care in 2015.31
Most outpatient treatment 
centres are run by private 
practices. Yet, a small proportion 
of these treatments are provided 
by hospitals.32 
The private sector provides most of 
the outpatient care: in 2015, 8001 
outpatient care specialists work in a 
private practice and 3745 in public 
hospitals.33 
Specialist outpatient care is 




++ ± ± + + ++
PE investments expanded 
significantly. In 2018, 855 deals 
worth $100 billion were made. 
Leverage buyout increased from 
5% in 2000 to 14% in 2018%.13 
Although the involvement of 
PE funds in the UK seems to be 
more active in the long-term 
care sector. They are also active 
in the hospital sector. Eg, Circle 
Health belongs to a PE firm. In 
2019, they are merging with BMI 
healthcare.34 
The largest private hospital 
chain (Quironsalud) was bought 
from two different PE firms 
to the German hospital chain, 
Fresenius.35
Between 2013 and 2018, 22% 
of the PE acquisitions in the 
healthcare sector were in the 
hospital sector. These accounted 
for 27 hospitals.36 
Although it is difficult to obtain 
information for Australia, Australia 
is together with China and India the 
country with the highest activity 
of PE firms in the Asia-Pacific.37 In 
2019, the second largest private 
hospital chain was taken over by 
Brookfield Asset Management.38
The expansion of the private 
sector in Poland caught the 
attention of PE firms.14 Eg, 
the largest private provider of 
outpatient healthcare was owned 




patient care (if 
possible, private 
sector specific)
++ ++ +++ ++ ++ ±
90% of Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas had highly concentrated 
hospital markets in 2016.39
The four largest private hospital 
chains cover 60% of the total 
independent hospital sector.27
The private hospital market has 
especially in Barcelona strongly 
consolidated over the years.40 
40% of hospitals operate in 
highly concentrated hospital 
markets.41
The four largest private hospital 
groups own ± 80% of the for-profit 
hospitals.42
The total hospital market is fairly 
concentrated.43 
Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; NHS, National Health Service; PE, private equity; ASC, ambulatory surgical centre; ICU, intensive care unit.
+++ very high, ++ high, + somewhat high, ± neutral, – somewhat low, - - low, - - -  very low.
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3. For-profit hospitals that are most likely to default on their 
payments may be acquired by other hospitals, leading to 
a more consolidated hospital market. A consolidated 
hospital market does not lead to lower pricing and may 
not enhance value.46
Policy-makers may want to conduct an assessment, like that 
in Table 2, of the likely impact on the wider healthcare system 
of financial distress in the for-profit hospital sector. 
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